按：基辛格于1973至1977年间任美国国务卿。本文于2014年3月5日发表于《华盛顿邮报》。
Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end
Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
关于乌克兰的公众讨论都不离对抗。但我们是否知道自己意欲何为？我一生亲历四场战争，皆是以高度热情及公众支持为始，而不知以何为终，其中的三场我们单方面撤了军。对政策的考验是它如何终结，而不是如何开始。
Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.
乌克兰问题总是呈现一决胜负的局面：乌克兰是要加入东方还是西方。但如果乌克兰要生存和发展，她断然不可成为一方对抗另一方的前哨——她要在其间起桥梁的作用。
Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.
俄罗斯必须认识到，试图强迫乌克兰成为一个附属，进而再一次推移俄罗斯的边境，注定会令俄罗斯重蹈覆辙，进入与欧洲和美国相互施压的自我实现循环。
The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.
西方必须理解，对俄罗斯而言，乌克兰永远不可能成为一个一般意义上的域外国家。俄罗斯历史始于所谓的基辅罗斯。俄罗斯宗教从那里发展。乌克兰在数个世纪中都是俄罗斯的一部分，而且他们的历史在此之前也相互交织。自1709年的波尔塔瓦会战起，几次俄罗斯争取自由的最重要战争都是在乌克兰土地上打的。俄罗斯向地中海投射军力的手段——黑海舰队，是基于克里米亚的塞瓦斯托波尔长期租赁的。即便是像亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴和约瑟夫·布罗茨基这样的异见者，也坚持认为乌克兰曾是俄罗斯历史的一部分，事实上也曾是俄罗斯的一部分。
The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.
欧盟必须承认，其官僚主义的拖沓以及战略要素向内政的屈服，促使谈判变成了危机。外交政策是确立优先级的艺术。
The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 , when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or break up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.
乌克兰人是决定性因素。他们生活在一个历史复杂、语言多样的国家里。西部在1939年斯大林和希特勒瓜分战利品时并入苏联。克里米亚的人口百分之六十是俄罗斯族，在1954年成为乌克兰的一部分，是出生于乌克兰的尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫将其作为俄罗斯与哥萨克协议三百年庆的一部分授予的。西部主要是天主教，东部主要是东正教。西部说乌克兰语，东部主要说俄语。规律表明，一方统治另一方的任何尝试都会最终导致内战或分裂。要把乌克兰作为东西对抗的一部分，将在数十年内令任何俄罗斯与西方，特别是欧洲，整合成为一个内部合作系统的前景暗淡无光。
Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanu-kovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymo-shenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.
乌克兰独立仅23年时间；此前自14世纪开始，其一直处于某种外国统治之下。其领导人并未学会妥协的艺术，更谈不上历史观，这不出人意料。乌克兰独立后的政治表明，问题根源于乌克兰政客将意志强加于国内不服从地区，先是一派如此，然后另一派再来。这就是维克多·亚努科维奇与他政治原则上的对头，尤利娅·季莫申科的矛盾的本质。他们代表乌克兰的两派，而不愿分析力量。明智的美国对乌政策将寻求该国两派彼此合作的途径。我们应该寻求和解，而不是一方主导。
Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.
俄罗斯与西方，特别是乌克兰各方，并未基于此原则行事。各方都令局势恶化了。俄罗斯在多处边境危机重重之际，无法强行付诸军事手段而不遭到孤立。对西方而言，妖魔化普京并非一种政策，而是缺乏政策的证明。
Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.
普京应该意识到，无论他有何不满，军事胁迫将导致另一场冷战。而美国，则需要避免像对待异类一样对待俄罗斯，不断去说教华盛顿所建立的行为准则。普京是严肃的战略家——范畴是俄罗斯历史。理解美国价值观及民族性不是他的强项。而理解俄罗斯历史以及民族性也不是美国政策制定者的强项。
Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:
各方领导人应回归到对后果的审视上来，而不是竞相做姿态。以下是我对符合各方价值观以及安全利益的结果的想法：
1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
1. 乌克兰应有权选择包括欧洲在内的经济和政治伙伴。
2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.
2. 乌克兰不应加入北约，七年前我在此问题上一次出现时即持此立场。
3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.
3. 乌克兰应自由地创立符合其人民所表达的意愿的任何形式的政府。明智的乌克兰领导人彼时会采取和解国内各方的政策。在国际上，他们应追求类似芬兰的立场。该国毫无疑问地强烈追求独立以及与西方合作，但谨慎地避免制度性地对俄罗斯采取敌对立场。
4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
4. 俄罗斯吞并克里米亚并不符合现有世界秩序。但将克里米亚与乌克兰的关系置于不那么令人忧虑的基础之上应该是可能的。为此，俄罗斯要承认乌克兰对克里米亚的主权。乌克兰要通过国际观察员在场之下举行的选举来加强克里米亚的自治。此过程应包括消除有关黑海舰队在塞瓦斯托波尔港的地位的任何模糊性。
These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.
这些都是要则，而不是药方。熟悉这一地区的人民会明白它们并不会对所有各方的口味。考验并不在于达成绝对满意，而在于不满达成平衡。如果不能基于这些或类似要素达成某种解决方案，走向对抗的趋势就会加速。那个时刻将很快到来。
